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Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, research has enveloped numerous areas within the 
psychological sciences as a means to increase the ability to spot potential threats. While 
airports took to heightened security protocols, many academics looked deeper into ways of 
detecting deception within international airport settings. Various verbal and nonverbal 
systems were intensely scrutinised under the empirical magnifying glass with the aim of 
creating security environments that are better able to detect potential threats. However, in 
2018, a €4.5m grant from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme, number 700626, was awarded to further in vivo test the use of computational 
methods to detect deception from facial cues. The system is deemed a non-invasive 
psychological profiling system and stems from that of a system called ‘Silent Talker’ 
(Rothwell, Bandar, O’Shea, & McLean, 2006). The ‘iBorderCtrl' AI system uses a variety of 
‘at home' pre-registration systems and real-time ‘at the airport' automatic deception detection 
systems. Some of the critical methods used in automated deception detection is that of micro-
expressions. In this opinion article, we argue that considering the state of the psychological 
sciences current understanding of micro-expressions and their associations with deception, 
such in vivo testing is naïve and misinformed. We consider the lack of empirical research that 
supports the use of micro-expressions in the detection of deception and question the current 
understanding of the validity of specific cues to deception. With such unclear definitive and 
reliable cues to deception, we question the validity of using artificial intelligence that 
includes cues to deception, which have no current empirical support.   






Airport Artificial Intelligence Can Detect Deception – Or am I lying? 
 
It has been announced recently that several European Airports will begin to test the 
usability of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems to detect whether travellers are making 
deceitful statements. The ‘iBorderCtrl' AI system, which was granted €4.5m for development, 
will be tested in: Hungary, Latvia, and Greece, on passengers who are travelling from outside 
of the European Union (EU). The technology and computer programming involved does 
indeed appear highly technical and suggests a significant advancement in the pursuit of 
accurately detecting deception. The notion of pre-arrival registration, advanced biometrics 
and face matching all have the allure of a failsafe system designed to enhance the national 
and international security in areas of high risk, namely international airports. The system will 
be in vivo tested1. In vivo is a reference to when a test that involves a living organism (i.e., a 
human) is explored in the environment it is meant to be applied. In the current paper, this 
refers to the removal of testing in the laboratory to testing in the field and with members of 
the general public. 
Popular media such as Lie to Me has seen an increase in characters like Dr Cal 
Lightman and his ‘wizard’ type abilities to detect deception (Levine, Serota, & Shulman, 
2010; Su & Levine, 2016) and the portrayal of advanced technological systems as seen in CSI 
(Baskin & Sommers, 2010) has led many to overestimate what science can and cannot do. 
However, implementing an AI system based on weak theoretical science, which may appease 
the public, is likely to results in serious (possibly fatal) inaccuracies and reliance upon – what 
we will argue – is a flawed approach. The focus of this opinion piece is to provide readers 
with a simplified description of AI and a brief background into the history of lie detection 
                                                 
1 Note, between submission of article and publication, the iBorderCtrl system has been tested, and initial 
anecdotal evidence suggests that it resulted in a false positive (Gallagher & Jona, 2019). We hope future 
developers of such technology will heed the advice in this article and/or contact the authors to discuss 
developing such systems. 
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research, to include verbal and nonverbal indicators, and micro-expressions (the main cues 
used in the iBorderCtrl system and that of Lie to Me). Finally, while we acknowledge that 
advancing our understanding of deception may be aided by computational methods, we feel it 
pertinent not to allow the public or practitioners to be blinded by the seductive technicalities 
of a system that could wrongly sway professional/TSA judgements about passengers’ honesty 
and intentions, which could have dire consequences. The main argument that we will propose 
is that the cues that AI systems use do not yet have enough underlying diagnostic value in 
terms of differentiating truth tellers from liars. Finally, we discuss some of the more recent 
techniques currently under investigation that may be more suitable to be implemented in 
airport scenarios.  
Nonverbal Cues to Deception 
The current state of psychological science suggests that nonverbal methods for 
detecting deception are often limited and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003) and often only 
barely identify deception above chance levels of accuracy (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). For 
example, DePaulo and colleagues (2003) found that of 158 possible cues to deception, 
ranging from the more subtle, such as response latency and gaze aversion to the more obvious 
such as postural shifts and shrugs, very few were found to be significantly correlated with 
deception. For example, obvious stereotypical cues to deception such as gaze aversion, 
fidgeting, silent pauses and facial expressiveness were not commonly found amongst 
individuals who were being deceptive. Very few cues emerged as having a relationship with 
deception, and of those that did (e.g., liars are less forthcoming, provide fewer compelling 
tales, create a negative impression, are tenser and provide fewer unusual details than truth 
tellers), the statistical correlation between such cues and deceptive behaviour was very low. 
To this day, we are still not able to identify clear and highly significant behavioural cues 
when individuals are lying or telling the truth. There is no single ‘tell’ or Pinocchio’s’ nose 
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for deception (Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij, Leal, 
Mann, Vernham, & Brankaert, 2015; Vrij, Mann, Leal, Vernham, & Vaughan, 2016). AI 
programmes based upon such approaches, therefore, are destined to fail by producing 
unacceptable levels of accuracy considering their use in security contexts.   
Notwithstanding the overall findings that nonverbal cues to deception are weak and 
unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003), a recent exploratory study into publication bias, small effect 
sizes and underpowered studies (Luke, 2018) indicates that our current understanding of cues 
to deception may be deeply flawed. Luke states: “That is to say, the informational value of 
the present literature is so low as to make it virtually impossible to distinguish real effects 
from false positives” (2018, p. 2). Have we, therefore, been deceived about what deceivers do 
when they lie? Is there any evidence at all that we can detect deception? The answer is one 
that is open to much speculation and underpins why the use of AI within the current state of 
psychological science is potentially hazardous. If we do not know what cues we need to look 
for, then the notion that a programmed set of algorithms or can detect deception is misguided 
and destined to fail. However, many people do erroneously believe they can learn Cal 
Lightman's skills and spot lies; therefore, false confidence is given to systems like 
iBorderCtrl that do the same thing with more technologically advanced infrastructure.  
What is Artificial Intelligence? 
While most people understand the word artificial, what needs a clear definition is the 
aspect of intelligence. Despite years of research, we still have very few clear definitions of 
what constitutes intelligence, with many books on AI discussing how AI asks itself what AI is 
(Bringsjord & Schimanski, 2003). This alone makes the definition of AI reasonably complex. 
In its purest form, AI is the ability of a computer to respond, as if it were using human 
intelligence to particular stimuli (Poole, Mackworth, & Goebel, 1998). While writing 
programmes that appear smart may be possible, their interpretation of meaningful, junk or 
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noisy outcomes is often lacking. However, what AI does is learn through experience, which 
is called machine learning (ML). ML is defined by a computer’s ability to demonstrate the 
process of learning (Samuel, 1959). To fully complete the process: useful AI is built upon 
ML, and most ML is built upon neural networks (NN). A NN is a computational system that 
mimics how human cognition is organised into networks. In the 1960s, the first NN 
demonstrated that digital synapses could amend themselves in line with pattern recognition 
was developed (Widrow & Hoff, 1960).  
What is iBorderCtrl Proposing? 
 The iBorderCtrl system is proposing the use of an Automatic Deception Detection 
System (ADDS), by analysing an individual’s ‘nonverbal micro expressions’ (iBorderCtrl, 
2019, p. 2). This is the second stage of the process. The initial stages require pre-registration 
from the travellers’ home, using the internet, much akin to online check-in.  Part of the 
second stage also assesses biometric data, to include fingerprint and vein pattern analysis. 
ADDS was built upon findings from two research papers (Rothwell et al., 2006; Rothwell, 
Bandar, O’Shea, & McLean, 2007). The first (Rothwell et al., 2006) we refer to as part of its 
title, ‘Silent Talker’ and the second (Rothwell et al., 2007), as its full name: Charting the 
behavioural state of a person using a backpropagation neural network. When one reviews the 
article ‘Silent Talker’ (Rothwell et al., 2006), there are clear fundamental methodological 
issues with the data. There is a significant issue with the number of participants used. Ten 
truthful participants and seven deceptive participants formed the sample upon which accuracy 
of up to 79% was reported. Closer inspection of the data also shows that initial trials yielded 
deception accuracy rates of 54% (Rothwell et al., 2006, p. 769). Further trials also showed 
deception detection rates as low as 14% (Rothwell et al., 2006, p. 772). In their second paper, 
the numbers are even higher cause for concern. Their sample consisted of only 15 English 
men, to make their lying and truth telling sample. Despite their use of vectors for repeated 
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testing, initial accuracy for deception is 77% and truthful 72% (Rothwell et al., 2007, p 332). 
Some of the findings also show truth accuracy as low as 43%. This is below the odds of 
chance alone. Using three as the number of dependent variables, as per Rothwell et al, 
(2007), G*Power analyses concede that to obtain even a small effect size of .2, with a modest 
(arguably somewhat unacceptable) level of power of .8, a total of 60 participants (30 liars and 
30 truth tellers) should be used (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Therefore, we 
argue that the studies upon which iBorderCtrl has been built are majorly underpowered. 
Are Micro-Expressions Reliable Indicators of Deception? 
Before we build a complex computer-assisted deception detector, it is important to 
investigate where this approach begins in the research literature. Micro-expressions are innate 
involuntary physical responses to emotional stimuli, typically used to indicate a 
mismatch/disharmony between what is being said by an individual, and what is  felt (Marono, 
Clarke, Navarro, & Keatley, 2018; Marono, Clarke, Navarro, & Keatley, 2017). Micro-
expressions typically occur as fast as 1/15 to 1/25 of a second, and are therefore 
imperceptible to the human eye, and cannot accurately be detected in real time; this means 
that we cannot observe an individual and decipher his or her micro-expressions as they occur 
(Honts, Hartwig, Kleinman, & Meissner, 2009). Besides, individuals rarely display micro-
expressions at best (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Individuals who have studied the automation 
of detecting micro-expressions have stated that it is a very difficult cue to standardise. 
“Deceptive behaviour is very subtle and varies across different people. Thus, detecting these 
subtle micro motion patterns… is a challenging problem” (Wu, Singh, Davis, & 
Subrahmanian, 2017, p. 2). The level of challenges that current computational micro-
expression detection systems face means that it is by no means ready for in vivo testing.  
Irrespective of the potential problems with using micro-expressions as a method to detect 
deception overall, micro-expressions have received minimal empirical testing. While Paul 
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Ekman founded the notion of micro-expressions, he has never published any of his micro-
expression related research (Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014). The underlying theory behind 
micro-expressions is that of leakage (Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 2016), the notion that 
our true emotions of feelings leak from within, more often referred to as the classical theory 
of emotions (Nguyen et al., 2012).  
Ekman based his work on the findings from a system called ‘Emotion Facial Action 
Coding System (EMFACS)', created in the 1980s (Ekman, 2019). This system allows for the 
movements of the face to be tracked and inferences drawn as to the inner state of the 
individual. However, Ekman’s theories have been heavily criticised. Lisa Feldman Barrett, a 
professor of psychology at Northeastern University stated that she first explored the theory as 
a graduate student. She came across Ekman’s methods when looking for objective ways to 
measure emotion. Feldman Barrett realised that Ekman’s work was limited by the 
participants having been provided labelled expressions to match to faces in his work. Barrett 
Feldman believed that Ekman ‘primed’ his participants. Barrett Feldman repeated the study, 
without labels, and found that the recognition of emotions fell dramatically (Barrett Feldman, 
2014). Barret Feldman went on to develop her own theory of emotions (Barrett Feldman, 
2017a). She states that there are no universal areas of the brain that are related to emotions 
that are activated by external stimuli. Not only do micro-expressions have little in terms of 
empirical evidence, but the theoretical and experiential evidence also shows severe flaws in 
the methodology upon which the classical theory of emotions is built.  
The hype surrounding micro-expressions appears to be more related to publications in 
popular media than science (Adelson, 2004; Best, 2017; Henig, 2006). Micro-expressions are 
idiosyncratic. Individuals vary in the types of micro-expressions they exhibit, and 
interpretation comes down to subjective experiences. AI cannot ‘unpack' the subjective 
meaning and nuances across different people and situations. It is objective in running 
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equations and programs. The fact that emotional expressions are idiosyncratic and do not 
respond to the same stimuli suggests that measures of micro-expressions can only lead to 
inaccurate readings and that its use in high-security contexts has potentially dangerous 
consequences. The notion that we all display the same small furrowing of the brows during 
anger (Ortony & Turner, 1990, p. 319) or pursing of the lips when we are disgusted (Rozin, 
Lowery, & Ebert, 1994) is, unfortunately, an unsupported assumption. There are no standard 
responses amongst homo sapiens to particular stimuli (Barrett Feldman, 2017b, 2017a). 
However, Rothwell et al., (2006) have stated that the objectivity of the system is a benefit, 
allowing it to override that of human error resulting from fatigue etc. Such a statement 
appears nonsensical given our understanding of overt human emotion.  
However, What About Passports and Biometrics? Surely, They Are Reliable? 
The National Crime Agency has recognised that identity crime often enables 
individuals to pass freely between borders because of the use of genuine identity documents 
(National Crime Agency, 2017). However, the use of biometric additions to passports, often 
seen as enhancing security, is open to spoofing (Gold, 2012; Hadid, 2014; Marcel, Nixon, & 
Li, 2014). Fingerprints are, unfortunately, no longer the holy grail of identification we once 
held them to be due to their alteration (Soweon Yoon, Jianjiang Feng, & Jain, 2012). The 
unique elements of our iris are easily spoofed with contact lenses (Kohli, Yadav, Vatsa, 
Singh, & Noore, 2016), and our gait is effortlessly changed (Gafurov, Snekkenes, & Bours, 
2007). Although vein analysis may be seen as a turning point, it too is not without limitations. 
Researchers have shown that their efficacy is profoundly affected by factors such as wet 
palms (e.g., the nervous traveller), dry palms, skin conditions and scars (Nguyen et al., 2012). 
However, the most worrying of all is the potential spoofing of facial attributes, which again 
would render a system which works on the specifics of the face impractical (Hadid, 2014). 
However, iBorderCtrl does acknowledge such downfalls: 
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Despite the extensive use of biometrics on security applications including in border 
control with the advent of digital passports that contain fingerprints digital images and 
physical characteristics of individuals, a traveller with ill intentions using own 
documents, biomarkers would not reveal their attempted deceit. iBorderCtrl deploys 
well established as well as novel technologies together to collect data that will move 
beyond biometrics and onto biomarkers of deceit (iBorderCtrl, 2019). 
Biomarkers refer to an individual's inner state. Based on what we have discussed in the 
current opinion piece and that of numerous psychological studies, there are no ways of 
accurately assessing a human's inner state due to their idiosyncratic nature. Irrespective of 
whether this is carried out by a human or a machine. Using biomarkers as a method above 
and beyond that of biometrics is merely a complete misconception.   
An Artificial Crisis 
Despite the rapidly growing integration of AI and ML into our everyday lives, we are 
facing what many experts are referring to as a ‘science crisis' (Ghosh, 2019). Allen (2019, 
cited in Ghosh, 2019) states that the facilitation of machine learning is leading research 
scientists to analyse data via computational methods that are often completely erroneous and 
that the flaw in analysis means there is a lack of trust in such findings. We now take a closer 
look at the use of AI and ML within deception research and many of the problems that 
systems such as the ‘iBorderCtrl’ need to consider, before the use of in vivo testing.   
Why Deception Detection is Not Ready For AI 
Machine learning algorithms are mostly what is known as ‘black boxes', as it is 
difficult to know how much deception they detect (Nortje & Tredoux, 2019) especially when 
tested in vivo. Unless every passenger is put through a complete security check, irrespective 
of the output of the systemoutput, we have no definite hit or miss rates. This is a crucial point 
to argue as to why AI within deception detection should be more rigorously tested within the 
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safe confinements of a lab until we hit accuracy rates which can be deemed acceptable within 
security environments. What is critical in this argument towards our concern regarding the 
use of AI in areas of high security is that AI and machine learning are faced with similar 
obstacles to that of human assessors; the ‘gold standard’ of known veracity (Nortje & 
Tredoux, 2019, p. 10). Neither AI nor a human can be sure of a veracity status or ‘ground 
truth’ without substantial evidence. This is where we hit upon a quandary. If both human and 
ML systems can never be sure of an individual’s veracity status, then what exactly is it that 
the machine is looking for? What is even more worrying is that despite the €4.5m grant used 
to develop the system, the final decision as to a passengers flight eligibility will be made by a 
human. “iBorderCtrl is a human in the loop system, and the Border Guard will use his/her 
experience in making the final decision” (iBorderCtrl, 2019). Given our current 
understanding, that experts rarely exceed accuracy levels above those of lay individuals 
(Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; Mann, Vrij, Bull, Vrij, & Bull, 2018; 
O’Sullivan, Frank, Hurley, & Tiwana, 2009; Vrij et al., 2015), relying upon a Border Guards 
expertise is only adding further potential error to a system, which is yet to yield accuracy 
rates that would be deemed acceptable within a high-security setting. This seems like a 
‘failsafe’ approach to not relying on technology; however, if humans are to make the final 
choice, then why not use the €4.5 in further interpersonal deception detection research? 
 What would be more logical, based upon the meager number of participants used to explore 
the automation of the detection of micro-expressions (Rothwell et al., 2006), would be to use 
Monte Carlo simulations. Doing so allows for a better understanding of the potential risk of a 
system). Alternatively, cross-validation is also recommended, a method which allows the 
simulation of an infinite number of participants  (Kleinberg, Arntz, & Verschuere, 2019). 
Both systems can be completed in rapid time using specific programmes. By doing so, not 
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only is there less of a burden on public expenditure, but potential errors can be identified 
(e.g., if the system will fail, it will be known almost immediately, and changes can be made).  
Is In Vivo Testing A Waste of Time? 
We answer the above: Is in vivo testing a waste of time? Absolutely not. In vivo 
testing allows research scientists to overcome many aspects of experimental testing that are 
associated with laboratory research. Many studies have had to defend their lack of mundane 
realism, replicability and participant motivation (Marono et al., 2017a, 2017b; Keatley, 
2018). How do psychologists get individuals who are clearly taking part in a scientific 
experiment to behave as if they would if they were really lying? How can we compare a 
student attempting to gain negligible participant allowance with an airline passenger 
attempting to transfer location for terrorist activity? The majority of research in deception 
detection is conducted on student, WEIRD (western, educated, industrialised, rich, and 
democratic cultures [Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010]) samples, which in essence 
creates a false representation of overall human behaviour (Jones, 2010). This provides limited 
ecological validity. This points towards the use of in vivo testing; however, there should be an 
apparent gap between ‘testing' and ‘proving'. We are not suggesting that iBrderCtrl should 
not be tested, merely that the system should not be relied upon without stringent testing – a 
hurdle we feel it is unable to overcome, given the limited theoretical foundations upon which 
it is based. 
In addition, with in vivo testing comes media interest, a clear public presence and a 
misunderstanding of what the results are telling us (Lovell-Badge, 2013). As an exemplifier, 
iBorderCtrl has been reported in many mainstream media outlets, such as the BBC 
(Woollacott, 2017), the Telegraph (Bernal, 2018) and the Express (McGrath, 2018). Online 
platforms have not only been quick to support the movement but have suggested human 
rights violations (EDRi, 2019) and the fact that iBorderCtrl has dangerously understood the 
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concept of AI (ActuIA, 2019). Petitions have been sent to the Greek Government calling for 
its removal from in vivo testing (Homo Digitalis, 2019) and have further suggested that it is 
impossible to check whether such a system is permittable under European Law and that “its 
credibility and validity can not be proven” (Homo Digitalis, 2019, our translation). 
Implementing in vivo testing of an automated system, based upon methods which 
have already been shown to be an ineffective method for differentiating between honest and 
dishonest individuals, is not only an argument against the use of poor public spending but 
makes little, if any, methodological sense. While the argument may posit that an automated 
system can detect micro-expressions, their detection has no direct causal relationship with an 
individual's inner state. Moreover, for those individuals who do not display micro-
expressions (Porter & Brinke, 2008), there is little use of an automated system to detect them. 
The use of AI to detect deceptive cues which are unlikely to exist is one that is a counter-
intuitive advancement in lie detection. In essence, AI will currently work with weak 
theoretical understandings of deception and a great deal of human (error-prone) input (Nortje 
& Tredoux, 2019).  
A Possible Future For AI? 
What should be made clear is that we are not dismissing the use of AI in future 
deception detection research. Potentially, AI has many advantages over the standard 
computational power of humans, irrespective of expertise or intelligence. We suggest one 
potential area where AI experts could assist deception researchers. Current research suggests 
that verbal indicators to deception are currently showing to be the most discriminative 
between liars and truth tellers. After the seminal findings of the meta-analysis into nonverbal 
cues by DePaulo et al. (2003), researchers in deception moved their focus to verbal cues, in 
particular methods which would exploit differences between liars and truth tellers by eliciting 
more cues to deceit (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Such verbal veracity tools tend to work on the 
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premise of encouraging an interviewee to say more (Vrij, Fisher, Blank, Leal, & Mann, 
2016), increasing cognitive load such that lying becomes more difficult (Debey, Verschuere, 
& Crombez, 2012) and providing a model statement so that individuals know the amount and 
type of detail they should be able to provide (Sartori, Tasios, Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018). 
Such methods allow analysts to identify particular traits in the individual’s speech patterns, 
from detecting consistency, inaccuracies, core versus peripheral details or statement length, to 
name only but a few. The idea behind these methods is that they should make recall taxing 
for a liar whilst benefiting the truth teller (for more examples see the Strategic Use of 
Evidence [Granhag & Hartwig, 2015], Cognitive Credibility Assessment [Vrij, Fisher, & 
Blank, 2017], Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception [ACID] [Colwell, Hiscock-
Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett, 2007] and the Verifiability Approach [Nahari, 2018]). 
However, over time, language changes (Freeborn, 2006). The intricacies of modern 
language do not represent the same verbal prose documented 100 years ago. Language also 
changes across the lifespan (McLennan, 2006; Wang, 1979). Working on this premise, the 
language we use in 20 years will change as we age and as a society, 100 additional years are 
likely to amend the same linguistic traits we use today. AI has the potential to predict such 
changes in language. Due to the computational power of AI, ML and NN, if AI specialists 
were to integrate data from many years previous on the way that human language has 
developed, then predictions about how it may change in the future should be able to be made. 
Such predictions will allow deception researchers the ability to stay ‘one step ahead’, 
designing verbal veracity tools which will be ready before such changes in language even 
appear.  
Current Alternatives to iBorderCtrl 
Assessing individuals in an airport scenario requires rapid evaluation. We appreciate 
that verbal veracity tools (those which encourage the interviewee to say more, allowing for 
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their responses to be scrutinised) is not necessarily the most viable method under the 
circumstances. One method proposed where AI or automation may be useful is by using The 
Rigidity Effect (RE [Burgoon, 2018]). The RE postulates that when an individual is faced 
with deception under high stake situations, there is an initial freeze response (see Jansen, 
Nguyen, Karpitskiy, Mettenleiter, & Loewy, 1995 for an overview of autonomic responses to 
threat). Research has shown that individuals manage their nonverbal behaviour and overall 
impression so that they appear credible (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, White, & Rockwell, 1996). 
Working on the theoretical basis of rigidity, studies have shown that blinking reduces during 
deception (Leal & Vrij, 2008) and the suppression of one facial expression led to the 
suppression of all facial expressions (Hurley & Frank, 2011). However, despite being told to 
suppress rigidity, countermeasure studies have shown that this is a challenging endeavour 
(Twyman, Proudfoot, Schuetzler, Elkins, & Derrick, 2015).  
Using a theoretical framework of probabilistic functionalism proposed by Brunswik 
(1952), Hartwig and Bond (2011) found that we may not be as weakly attuned to deceptive 
cues as the literature would suggest, but that the issue is inherent that the behavioural 
differences between liars and truth tellers are weak at best. Hartwig and Bond (2011) suggest 
that the elicitation of more explicit cues is needed, i.e., we need to evoke much stronger 
behavioural differences between liars and truth tellers. This in part can be achieved by 
increasing the cognitive load placed upon liars (see Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006; Vrij, 
Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Vrij & Ganis, 2014). If we are still unable to elicit clearer more 
identifiable cues – even if AI were to be able to detect them – it also means we still currently 
do not know what these cues are.     
  An Intelligent Honest Future? Perhaps Not Quite Yet 
Although we question the suitability of iBorderCtrl to be used in security settings in 
vivo currently, there is no doubt that AI will have a part to play in the future of deception 
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detection. The hour's researchers spend coding will no doubt soon be completed by an 
intelligent system which can understand the intricacies of human language. The current 
criticism falls on a severe misunderstanding of an anxiety heuristic, in which liars show fear 
and truth tellers do not, which manifests in their behaviour (Jupe & Hartwig, 2019), 
specifically, their micro-expressions. In addition, we believe iBorderCtrl is not designed upon 
theoretical underpinning and uses indices which do not have a direct correlation with 
deception.  
AI researchers must consider the complexity of lies, in which all are not equal in 
terms of moral, meaning, and potential outcomes. The father who lies to his child about the 
existence of Santa Claus is a far cry from the same man lying to his wife about a prolonged 
affair with her best friend. Even so, these lies are leagues away from a psychopathic, 
emotionless serial killer, who denies his wrongdoing despite the devastation he or she causes 
to the lives of many. A serial killers’ lies will no doubt differ greatly from the suicide bomber 
who believes that the explosive device he will detonate mid-air is all for his greater calling in 
the name of religion. The refugee attempting to gain asylum to escape the horrors of their 
country is likely to show very different nonverbal behaviours than the terrorist attempting to 
enter the country for nefarious reasons. When we apply this to deception, denying that one 
was involved in a crime that they did commit, the evidence is unequivocal. Some liars feel 
guilt, others feel anxious, and others feel excitement (also known as the emotional approach 
to deception [(Vrij, 2000)]). If liars all feel different emotions and their emotions manifest 
differently in their overt behaviour, then why is there an assumption that we can interpret 
these to a level deemed acceptable in areas such as international airports? Until we fully 
understand and integrate the differences between liars and truth tellers, attempting to create a 
‘one-rule-fits-all’ algorithm is destined to fail. Dr Cal Lightman should, therefore, remain a 
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